This paper examines two main aspects of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in emerging market economies. First, it explores the interest rate -inflation relationship in economies with different levels of external and domestic public debt using panel and cross-section data. The results show that interest rate -inflation elasticity weakens with debt/GDP and external debt/GDP. Second, it utilizes highfrequency data from Brazil, Turkey, and Poland to examine how market-determined variables react to economic news. The results suggest that when vulnerabilities are high, budget news has the most significant impact on country spreads and interest rates, and the impact of monetary policy is weakened.
Introduction
The macroeconomic costs of increased public indebtedness are well-known and relatively uncontroversial.
2 Concerns about fiscal sustainability and a possible financial crisis in the context of increasing indebtedness, for example, can create an adverse cycle of higher borrowing costs and worsening fiscal balances. As debt and debt payments increase, the fiscal space available for other expenditures is correspondingly squeezed. High levels of public debt can also impede economic growth as the government crowds out private sector borrowing because of its own financing needs.
The macroeconomic policy costs of debt, in contrast, while discussed in the literature, are less firmly established, with some divergence of views. Some evidence exist s that points toward a statistical relationship between rising debt and fiscal performance (see, for example, Abiad and Baig (2005)), but there can also be other, equally important, channels through which public debt can affect policy. Monetary policy, for instance, could be constrained by the government's budgetary position, and from the conduct of fiscal policy itself. The concept of " fiscal dominance," in particular, has received considerable attention in both policy and academic circles 3 : a key aspect of this concerns the compatibility of a given monetary policy stance with a particular fiscal stance. A specific issue in this area has been regarding when and how monetary authorities may need to compensate for an overly expansionary fiscal policy.
This issue of an appropriate policy mix, or the constraints that a particular fiscal policy stance could impose on monetary authorities long predates the relatively recent moves toward central bank independence. It is a key element of stabilization policy formalized by Hicks (1952) , following the establishment of the Keynesian framework. What is more recent, however, is the recognition that despite the independence of monetary authorities, fiscal policy actions set the environment in which monetary policy may be strongly influenced and even severely constrained. As emphasized first by Mundell (1960) , even where the monetary authorities can offset the developments on the fiscal front, the resultant policy mix can have significant implications for financial markets and the real economy, including the term structure of interest rates, exchange rates, and inflationary expectations.
Such policy constraints are seen both in industrial as well as developing economies. For instance, in both sets of countries, in an environment of weak economic activity, large or rising budget deficits are often cited as constraining monetary authorities' ability to implement accommodative monetary policy. In an environment of robust activity, expansionary fiscal policy has been rightly seen to increase the need for a tight monetary policy. 4 In addition to the constraints on monetary policy imposed by the stance of fiscal policy, it is increasingly recognized that the impact of past fiscal decisions, or of budgetary developments generally, can also play an important role. To the extent that this may then constrain the conduct of monetary policy, a key instrument for stabilization may cease to be available. In cases where fiscal policy is in any case constrained, this can impose severe limitations on the ability of the policy makers to offset the impact of shocks, or to implement stabilization policy.
The circumstances under which monetary policy can be constrained can be illustrated readily: consider an essentially closed economy, with a large outstanding stock of government debt. 5 In such an economy, an increase in inflation or inflationary expectations, would warrant a tightening of monetary policy. But an increase in policy rates will raise long-term rates via the term-structure, increasing debt servicing costs. The larger the debt, ceteris paribus, the greater would be the impact. 6 In situations such as this one, the fiscal authorities have been seen to urge monetary authorities to tighten policy less than warranted, even though rising inflationary expectations would have led to an increase in the long-term nominal interest rates in any case.
Indeed, tightening of monetary policy could help in lowering inflationary expectations and flattening the yield curve. 4 In the United States, for instance, then Federal Reserve Governor Alan Greenspan's pronouncements that an unduly expansionary fiscal policy would constrain the conduct of monetary policy is notable (see Greenspan, 2004a, and 2004b) . 5 Assuming that all debt is denominated in domestic currency, has short to medium-term maturity, is held by domestic private agents, and is not indexed. 6 Given the short to medium maturities (say 1-5 years), higher rates will have to be paid on refinancing. Even if maturities were long, primary market new issuance will carry higher interest rates.
prominent strand of the literature focuses on the issues related to the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy (for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1987) , Debelle and Fischer (1994) , Dixit and Lambertini (2001) , Buti et al (2002) ). Another strand examines jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy (for example, Lucas and Stokey (1983) , Chari et al (1991) , Benigno and Woodford (2003) , Be etsma and Jensen (2002) , Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) , Correia et al (2003) ). Sargent and Wallace (1981) were among the first to formally highlight the monetary policy implications of the government budget constraint. They describe a "monetary dominant"
Government Budget Constraint, Monetary Policy and the Fiscal Theory of Price Level
regime where the monetary authority independently sets monetary policy, and a "fiscal dominant" regime where the fiscal authority sets its budget independently, announcing current and future deficits. In the latter case, the fiscal authority determines the financing needed for any given budget deficit through bond sales and seigniorage. It is shown that under a "fiscal dominant" regime, the monetary authority loses its ability to control inflation whenever the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy. If, for instance, high government deficits and debt raise the real interest rate to a level above the growth rate of the economy, monetary actions aimed at reducing inflation will increase the ratio of debt to GDP, as bond finance replaces monetary finance. This in turn raises interest payments and deficits in the future.
Eventually deficit financing requires more money growth and generates higher inflation in the future. 8 In such a situation, lower debt -if it reduces the real interest rate below the growth rate of the economy -could help restore the efficacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation.
More recently, the models of the 'fiscal theory of the price level' (as first discussed in Woodford, 1994) have suggested that fiscal policy, rather than monetary policy, can be the main determinant of inflation. In these models, the price level is the only variable that can balance the government's inter-temporal budget constraint. If the sequence of future budget surpluses is exogenously given, there is only one price level that can make the stock of nominal bonds inherited from the past consistent with the present value of those primary surpluses. Therefore, the government's inter-temporal budget constraint determines the price level. For i llustration, one can consider a case where the government introduces a tax cut that reduces the sum of the present discounted value of future primary balances. As a result, real household wealth increases, boosting aggregate demand and the price level. The real value of government debt thereby declines, helping restore balance in the inter-temporal budget constraint. 8 Sargent and Wallace (1981) also show that when the demand for base money depends on expected inflation, tighter money today can lead to higher inflation not only eventually, but starting today. 9 Studies that focus on this strand of the literature include Auernheimer and Contreras (1990), Benhabib et al (2001) , Canzoneri and Diba (1998) , Canzoneri et al (2001 Canzoneri et al ( , 2002 , Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) , Cochrane (1998 Cochrane ( , 2001 , Leeper (1991) , Loyo (1999) , Sims (1994 ), and Woodford (2000 . However, this view has A number of studies have examined empirically the extent of monetary and fiscal policy interaction in industrial countries. Most of these studies find that monetary policy typically has not accommodated fiscal policy, and some find that monetary policy has tended to tighten in response to loose fiscal policy. Melitz (1997 Melitz ( , 2002 The empirical literature on the impact of fiscal policy on exchange rate movements has focused mainly on the impact of fiscal policy on a country's vulnerability to currency crises.
Evidence suggests that large government deficits or market perceptions of lack of fiscal sustainability make an economy more vulnerable to currency crises (see Kopits (2000) , and
Hemming et al. (2003)).
14 More recent papers consider multi-equation models to investigate different channels of interaction and transmission from fiscal policy to monetary variables (Blanchard (2004), Favero and Giavazzi (2004) , and Giavazzi (2003) ). Analyzing the case of an inflation-targeting regime in an emerging market that is vulnerable to capital flows reversal, a key result from these studies is that large public debt, by boosting credit default risk, pushes the economy into a bad equilibrium, where a restrictive monetary policy can have unconventional effects. The dynamics of the 'bad' equilibrium (i.e., the one characterized by fiscal dominance) is as follows: in a country with large and mainly short-term public debt, an increase in interest rates aimed at keeping inflation within the target raises the cost of debt service. If the primary surplus remains 12 See, for example, Edwards (1984 Edwards ( ,1986 , Cline (1995) , Cantor and Packer (1996) , Cline and Barnes (1997) , Eichengreen and Mody (1998) , Min (1998) , Kamin and Kleist (1999) , Arora and Cerisola (2001) , Dell' Ariccia et al (2002 ), Ferrucci (2003 , IMF(2004) , Zoli (2004) . 13 See Easterly et al (1994) , and Agenor and Montiel (1996) , For industrial countries, empirical studies on the relationship between fis cal policy and interest rates have found mixed results. For example, Plosser (1982 Plosser ( , 1987 , Boothe and Reid (1989 ), and Evans (1985 , 1987a do not find any significant relationship between fiscal deficits and interest rates, whereas Wachtel and Young (1987) , Ford and Laxton (1999) , Kitchen (1996) , Elmendorf (1996) , and Canzoneri et al (2002) find that budget deficits have a significant impact on interest rates. 14 For industrial countries the evidence on the impact of fiscal policy on exchange rate movements is mixed. Some studies find a positive and significant relationship between fiscal expansions and the exchange rate (Feldstein (1986) , Melvin et al. (1989) , Beck (1993) ), while others do not find any statistically significant relationship (McMillin et al. (1990) , Koray and Chan (1991) ).
unchanged, the debt level, and hence the country premium will rise. This in turn triggers capital outflows leading to a depreciation of the exchange rate. If debt is mainly denominated in foreign currency, or linked to a foreign currency, the depreciation leads to a further increase in the value of debt. The exchange rate depreciation also affects inflation expectations, and eventually, inflation itself. This prompts the central bank to increase the interest rate again, which further increases the cost of debt service, and so on.
Zoli (2005) 
Cross-Country Analysis

Methodology
This section evaluates whether the reaction of monetary policy to inflation is affected by the stock of government liabilities across a wide cross-section of emerging markets. The analysis is undertaken in two stages: first, we estimate the following regression country-bycountry:
where it r is the overnight interest rate for countryi , and
is the rate of inflation over the past twelve months (lagged by one period). This rule, used by Alesina et al. (2001) , can be viewed as a simplified version of the Taylor rule without the output gap. The omission of the latter variable essentially reflects the significant difficulties entailed in computing potential output, and hence the output gap for emerging market economies. 15 In the second stage, we run cross-section regressions to explain the cross-country variation in the sensitivity of the overnight rate to inflation estimated from equation (1).
Stage 2:
where i β is the estimated parameter for countryi from equation (1 Although equations (1) and (2) are the basic estimating equations for this cross-country analysis, two alternative specifications are also estimated to test the robustness of the results.
First, we estimate a variant of equation (1) that posits the overnight interest rate for country i as a function of the lagged inflation rate, and the change in inflation over the preceding two periods:
This specification can be viewed as a simple rule in an inflaion targeting regime that defines the nominal interest rate target as a function of the deviation of inflation from the inflation target.
(The inflation rate in period 2 − t is used to proxy for the target).
We also estimate panel regressions of the following form:
This can be seen as an additional robustness check, since in this panel format the impact of crosscountry and intertemporal variation is explicitly brought to bear, and the two-stage regressions noted above are essentially subsumed into one.
Data
The analysis is conducted for a set of twenty-five emerging market economies, with a wide range of public debt profile, financial liberalization, and central bank independence. 16 We Table 3 . 1 shows the results of the regressions that explain the cross-country variation in the response of the overnight interest rate to inflation estimated in equation (1). We find strong evidence that the response of interest rate to inflation weakens with debt-to-GDP and external debt-to-GDP: the higher the debt ratios, the weaker the response (see first three columns of the Table 1 ). This result is generally robust across the various specifications noted below, and prima facie appears to be consistent with the proposition that higher levels of public indebtedness may end up constraining the response of the monetary authorities to changes in inflationary pressure.
Results
It is also noticeable that the coefficient on the external debt ratio is larger, although when both overall debt and external debt are included separately, only the overall debt variable is significant. The results of adding the financial liberalization index as a control variable are shown in columns (4)- (6). The coefficient of the index is positive and statistically significant in column (6), implying that the higher is the degree of financial liberalization, the stronger is the response of the overnight interest rate to inflation. The index, however, is not statistically significant in the other specifications.
Columns (7)-(10) report the regressions results with the index of central bank independence as an additional control variable. We do not find any significant relationship between the response of interest rate to inflation and the degree of central bank independence.
Taken together, these findings suggest that high levels of debt are likely to constrain the conduct of monetary policy in emerging market economies.
News Analysis
The cross-country analysis discussed above illustrates the constraint that might be imposed on the monetary authority's reaction function in emerging markets with different levels of debt. There is of course further scope for investigation, since as noted earlier, fiscal policy can cannot unambiguously specify the division of power between central banks and political authorities under all circumstances. Moreover, even when laws are relatively explicit, actual practice may diverge fro m them. Cukierman (1992) argues that legal independence measures may be a better proxy for actual independence in industrial countries than in developing countries. Cukierman (1992) The second strand of literature that our analysis draws upon concerns the channels of transmission of fiscal dominance emphasized by Blanchard (op.cit), and F avero and Giavazzi (op.cit). We estimate reduced form models, focusing on three segments of the transmission mechanism, namely the impact of fiscal policy on country premiums, interest rates and exchange rates. Specifically, we evaluate the effect of fiscal news on daily changes in country premium, exchange rates and interest rates, while controlling for other factors that affect such movements.
Following the methodological approach of Zoli (2005), we estimate the following reduced form equations for Brazil, Poland, and Turkey, three emerging market economies characterized by relatively high levels of public debt:
19 Recent studies focusing on emerging markets are Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998) , Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) , and Andritzky, Bannister and Tamirisa (2005 by its standard error to make the regression coefficients easily interpretable as the effect of a onestandard-error surprise in that release.
The regressor set also contains dummy variables that capture particular events concerning fiscal policy that might be relevant for investors assessing the default probability. Such events are grouped into two categories. The first includes concrete fiscal policy actions that might have enhanced investor confidence, such as budgetary cuts, or substantive steps in the advancement of pension and tax reforms ( action). The second comprises government announcements representing statements unaccompanied by immediate concrete actions, such as the declaration of the intention to raise the public sector surplus, also aiming at reassuring market participants (announcement). Given that the response to good and bad news may be asymmetric, we also break these two news items into "good" or "bad", and introduce them separately in the regressions (action_good, action_bad, announcement_good, announcement_bad) .
The regressor set also includes dummy variables for election days (elections), IMF related news (IMF), and four dummies corresponding to upgrades or downgrades of rating or outlook by the major rating agencies (rating_up, rating_down, outlook_up, outlook_down) . For
Turkey and Poland, we include also a dummy variable capturing news on the structural reform process towards the EU accession, and other EU related news (EU). Finally, a dummy is entered specifically for January 28, 2004, the day when the Fede ral Reserve Bank indicated that an increase in the Fed Fund rate was on the way, which was followed by significant movements in the emerging economies' bond market (US_expfedrateup). All explanatory variables are entered in the regressions also with a lag, to account for the possibility of delays in the response of spreads and exchange rates to news. 
Results
Before turning to the regressions estimating the impact of fiscal variables and fiscal policy events on country premium, exchange rate, and long-term interest rate, respectively, we analyze the relationship among these three dependent variables using impulse response functions. 22 In the case of Brazil, the response of the EMBI spread to shocks to the exchange rate and to long-term interest rate is significant, but very short lived. Similarly both the exchange rate and the interest rate respond significantly for few days only to shocks to the other two In fact, shocks to the EMBI spread neither have a significant impact on the exchange rate nor on long term interest rates. Similarly, shocks to the exchange rate have a very brief impact on interest rate, and no significant impact on country premium. Shocks to the interest rates have a short effect on the exchange rate, but no effect on the EMBI spread. The impulse response functions for Turkey indicate that the exchange rate responds positively and significantly to shocks to long term interest rates, but such response is very short lived (Figure 3 , Appendix 1).
Shocks to the EMBI spread have a significant, but very brief impact on long term interst rates.
Shocks to the exchange rate and to long term interest rate have virtually no effect on the country premium.
All in all, these findings suggest that, in Brazil, Poland and Turkey, shocks to one of the three endogenous variables under consideration appear to have little impact on the other two.
While this is of substantial interest in its own right, it also suggests that the reduced form approach adopted for the following empirical analysis seems appropriate.
4.1(a) Brazil
Column 1 of The coefficient of the lagged variable turns out to be positive and significant. This result is consistent with the findings in the literature on emerging market spreads, showing that movements in country premiums are mainly driven by global liquidity, and lenders' appetite for risk (Kamin and Kleist ( 1999) , Calvo et al (1993 ), Calvo (2002 , and Kumar and Persaud (2002)).
Among the other control variables, the IMF dummy (contemporaneous and lagged) has the expected negative and significant sign. Rating and outlook downgrades by rating agencies (rating_down and outlook_down) have the expected positive and highly significant coefficients.
The estimates for the determinants of domestic long-term interest rate movements are reported in column 2 of Table 3 . 2. Changes in the domestic interest rate tend to move together with changes in the EMBI spreads, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient. 23 The main explanatory variables are monetary and sovereign ratings : the unanticipated change in the Selic rate ( selic) is associated with increases in the domestic interest rate, while outlook downgrades by rating agencies lead to an increase in interest rates.
Column 3 reports the estimates of the impact of news on exchange rate movements. Since fluctuations in sovereign spreads are transmitted to the exchange rate via changes in capital flows, we added the lagged change in the EMBI spread as a regressor. The coefficient of this variable turns out to be positive and highly significant. The variable action has a negative and significant coefficient, implying that good news on fiscal policy actions led to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
In addition to this direct effect, news concerning fiscal policy actions also has an indirect effect on the exchange rate through its impact on the EMBI spreads. However, unexpected changes in the primary public sector borrowing requirement do not have a significant impact on exchange rate changes (the coefficient of the variable accounting for such events, primpsbr, is insignificant). This result is in line with the estimates for the spreads and the interest rate regressions. Unexpected changes in the Selic rate (selic) have a negative and significant impact on exchange rate changes. The dummies rating_down , outlook_up, and IMF also have significant coefficients, with the expected sign.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 .2 provide mixed evidence of fiscal dominance in
Brazil for the period of [2002] [2003] [2004] . The news on fiscal policy actions is seen to affect changes in spreads and exchange rate in a significant manner. However, the unanticipated component of data releases on the budget balance appears not to have exerted an appreciable impact on these variables.
4.1(b) Poland
Column 1 of Table 3 
4.1(c) Turkey
The analysis for Turkey focused on the impact of news on macro variables for two Table 3. 4 reports the estimation results for the former sample. With regard to the spreads regression (column 1), the coefficient of the variable capturing the surprise content of data releases on primary balance appears counterintuitive, and appears to imply that a higher than expected primary balance leads to lowering of spreads. This may reflect the paucity of reliable information and assessment, given the inflationary environment during that time. At the same time, the change in the central bank's policy rate (lagged by one period) has a positive and significant impact on spreads.
24 24 Forecasts for the central bank's policy rate are not available and so the variable is expressed as the change in the policy rate from the previous day.
Outlook downgrades by rating agencies (outlook_down ) lead to an increase in spreads.
However, the coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged variable are of opposite signs.
News concerning elections results in a lowering of spreads. We also added a dummy variable capturing news related to Turkey's potential EU accession. We split these news items into "good" or "bad" in terms of h ow it appeared to affect the likelihood of Turkey's accession recognizing the fact that the response to good and bad news may be asymmetric. 25 Results show that "bad" EU news (EU_bad) resulted in widening of the EMBI spread.
The impact of news on changes in the domestic interest rate is reported in column 2. The coefficient of the lagged percentage change in the EMBI spread is positive and highly significant, implying that changes in domestic interest rate tend to move together with changes in spreads. Among the other macroeconomic news variables, only trade balance and changes in the central bank overnight rate (cbrate_chg) have a significant impact on interest rate changes. These results are in line with those reported by Emir, Özatay, and Sahinbeyoglu (2004) who find the central bank policy rate change to be the only macroeconomic news variable that has a significant impact on the daily percentage change in the 3-month treasury bill rate. With regard to the other news dummies, elections has a negative and significant impact on domestic longterm interest rate changes.
Column 3 reports the estimates of the impact of news on exchange rate movements.
Exchange rate changes tend to oscillate in parallel with sovereign spreads, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of the lagged percentage change in EMBI spreads. Fiscal news, as captured by the unanticipated component of data releases on primary balance, does not have a significant impact on exchange rate changes. The coefficient of news on current account balance is significant, although its sign is counter-intuitive. With regard to U.S. macroeconomic news, lagged U.S. CPI and U.S. GDP have a positive and significant impact on exchange rate changes. Changes in domestic interest rate tend to move together with changes in EMBI spreads during this period (column 2). Also, positive surprises on the monthly CPI lead to an increase in the interest rate whereas news on primary balance had no impact on interest rates. Among the news on U.S macroeconomic variables, U.S. Fed, U.S. GDP, and U.S. Payroll have positive and significant impact on changes in the interest rate. Also, cbrate_chg and US_expfedrateup have a significant impact on the interest rate, as in the shorter sub-sample. In addition, "bad" fiscal policy announcements and "bad" fiscal policy actions are highly significant and correctly signed, suggesting that investors over-react to bad political n ews. Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) report a similar finding for nine Asian countries during the Asian crisis. Also, rating upgrades (rating_up) led to lowering of spreads during this period.
The estimates reported in column 3 show that changes in exchange rate move together with changes in EMBI spreads. U.S. Fed, U.S. GDP, and U.S. Payroll also have positive and significant impact on changes in the exchange rate. The expectation of an increase in the Fed Funds rate (US_expfedrateup) leads to a depreciation of the exchange rate during this period.
Bad fiscal policy announcements and bad fiscal policy actions also result in depreciation of the exchange rate. We also test the effect of rating upgrades (downgrades) and outlook upgrades (downgrades) on changes in the exchange rate. Rating downgrades (rating_down) are associated with significant upward movement in the exchange rate. Outlook upgrades by rating agencies (outlook_up) led to significant appreciation of the exchange rate.
These results show that country premium was affected by budget performance and Changes in the exchange rate moved together with changes in the EMBI spread. However, for the period Aug 2001-04, we do not find any significant relationship between data releases on primary balance and any of the dependent variables. Movements in the interest rate and exchange rate were affected by 'bad' fiscal policy announcements and 'bad' fiscal policy actions during this period.
Conclusion
This paper aimed to explore the policy costs of high public debt. However, given the variety of channels through which debt variables interact with other macroeconomic variables and policy actions, such an assessment requires a multifaceted approach adopted in the paper.
The analysis of the interest rate-inflation relationship in emerging economies with different levels of debt suggests that monetary policy efficacy is weaker with higher levels of overall and external pubic debt. This in turn appears to illustrate a constraint that high public debt may impose on monetary policy.
The high frequency data analysis of Brazil, Turkey, and Poland, with a focus on how essentially market-determined macro variables react to economic news, show s that when vulnerabilities are high, budget news has the most significant impact on spreads and interest rate, 
News on U.S. macroeconomic variables:
U.S. Fed: Difference between official data release and the forecasted value of the latest Fed Funds target rate (in percent). Source: Bloomberg.
U.S. CPI:
Difference between official data release and the forecasted value of the previous month's consumer price index inflation (in percent). Source: Bloomberg.
U.S. Trade balance:
Difference between official data release and the forecasted value of the previous month's trade balance. Source: Bloomberg.
U.S. GDP:
Difference between official data release and the forecasted value of the latest annual gross domestic product (in percent). Source: Bloomberg.
U.S. Payroll:
Difference between official data release and the forecasted value of the previous month's change in non-farm payrolls (in thousands). Source: Bloomberg.
